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by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*



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Western Powers Refer Berlin Crisis To U.N. Council

The United Nations General Assembly, its agenda crowded with urgent problems of all kinds, had been marking time while the Western powers and Russia sparred for position in Berlin. With the announcement on September 26 in Paris, however, that the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain and France had delivered identical notes to Moscow declaring that Russia's "illegal and coercive" blockade of Berlin rendered further negotiations impossible, the die has been cast for submission of the Berlin crisis to the UN. On September 27 the State Department issued a 25,000-word indictment of the Soviet Union, charging that while Premier Stalin had agreed to lift the Berlin blockade, once negotiations had been undertaken with his subordinates, the Russians had not only refused to raise their blockade over road and rail communications, but had proposed new restrictions on the airlift, on currency, and on Berlin's trade with Germany.

In their notes to the Kremlin, the Western powers accused the U.S.S.R. of creating "a threat to international peace and security," and stated that while they reserved the right to take "such measures as may be necessary to maintain their position in Berlin, they would refer to the Security Council "the action of the Soviet government." The appeal to the Council is expected to be made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which can set in motion the machinery of sanctions.

What Can U.N. Do?

The decision to appeal to the Security Council, where Russia will be able to

exercise the veto, was taken by the United States in preference to an appeal to the General Assembly where no nation has the veto, apparently for two main reasons. First, it was thought that a debate in the Security Council would focus public opinion on the issues at stake more forcefully than would be the case in the Assembly. Second, the Council has authority to take action, while the Assembly is limited to recommendations, as was clearly demonstrated in the Palestine case. The two decisions of the United States—to present so critical an issue as that of Berlin to the UN, and to refer it to the Council instead of the Assembly—represent a striking reversal of attitude toward the UN. In 1947, when many Americans urged submission of the Marshall plan to the UN, the Washington administration declared that the international organization was not adequate to cope with the proposed European recovery program. And at the 1947 Assembly session Secretary of State Marshall had urged the creation of the Interim Committee or Little Assembly precisely because action on urgent international problems had been frequently deadlocked in the Security Council as a result of the veto.

It must be assumed that the United States is counting not only on international airing of the Moscow negotiations concerning Berlin, which had hitherto been secret, but for a decision by the Security Council which would force Russia to accept the terms proposed by the Western powers for Berlin. The United States, according to authoritative reports, does not believe that Russia

is prepared to fight now, and does not expect the appeal to the Council will precipitate war. The discussion of the Berlin crisis may drag on for some time in the Council, offering both the Western nations and Russia an opportunity to state their case to the world. One result the United States might hope to achieve during this period would be consolidation of the Western European nations into a closely knit political, military and economic unit which today is still in the blueprint stage. Should the Council debate, however, result, as some predict, in Russia's withdrawal, the remaining members might have to decide whether merely to isolate Russia by severance of economic relations, communications and diplomatic relations, or to use armed force to bring about Russian compliance. In case it is decided to use armed force, it seems clear that under existing conditions the United States would have to carry the principal burden of war with the U.S.S.R.

In preparation for this showdown in the UN, the United States has been at pains to convince other nations that the East-West controversy is not "a dialogue between two nations," as stated by the Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Juan Bramuglia, but a fundamental conflict between Russia, on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other. This point emerged clearly from Secretary of State Marshall's address of September 23, in which he warned Russia not to mistake patience for weakness. Russia, for its part, has sought to rally popular support by Vishinsky's demand, on September 25, for a one-third cut in the armaments of the

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five great powers in one year as a first step toward disarmament.

Aims of U.S.

As the critical debate unfolds in the Palais de Chaillot, it should be borne in mind here that many questions are being asked by nations which fear Russian domination and Communist infiltration, but are also desperately anxious to know exactly what are the ultimate objectives of the United States. At no time since the end of the war has it been so necessary for Americans to understand that opposition to Russia and communism, no matter how justified by Russia's conduct, does not constitute a program capable of arousing the enthusiastic support of weary and disillusioned nations, and that it is imperative for this country to affirm, and continuously reaffirm, its positive aims.

The first question Europeans ask, by all accounts is whether the United States will stay *this* time. The emphasis on *this* time refers not merely to the haste with which Americans pulled out of Europe in 1919, but even more to the rapidity of American demobilization in 1945, which did much to convince Russia that the United States, once again, would take no responsibility for the outcome of the war it had done so much to win. It may seem incredible to Americans that the ERP and the success of the Berlin airlift have not yet convinced Europeans of our determination

to carry through now. Europeans, however, have seen so many pledges fall by the wayside in the past quarter of a century that they believe only what they see—and what they want to see if they are to take the risk, which for them might prove mortal, of another world war, are American forces and American armaments on the continent as concrete evidence that they will not be overrun a third time in one generation. But, contradictory as this may seem to us, Europeans, while wanting armaments, also fear the inroads arms expenditures will make in their as yet precarious reconstruction programs. It was at this vulnerable point that Russia's demand for armament cuts was skillfully aimed. Some observers had hoped that the United States might take the propaganda offensive by advocating its own armaments cut program coupled with ironclad international control provisions, leaving to Russia the onus of rejecting it—but Russia has once more been permitted to pitch the first ball.

In view of Europe's uncertainty concerning the staying power of the United States, it is difficult to see how this country could, for the present at least, pull out of Berlin. Whatever might have seemed advisable before the Russian blockade, Berlin has now become a symbol of this country's determination to fulfill its undertakings. Withdrawal would be interpreted not merely as a sign of weakness,

but what is worse, as a sign of fundamental irresponsibility.

But while holding the line in Berlin, the United States, if it is to gain the support of other UN members, should, according to independent observers, assure Europe and Asia that whatever action is taken with respect to Russia, such action will not spell opposition to all movements for change. In Europe this country yet has to convince other nations, no longer able to develop or restore capitalism as we know it, that we do not intend to interfere with their economic and social systems provided they protect basic human rights and do not resort to aggression. In Asia the question is being asked whether the United States will remain a champion of colonial peoples seeking to achieve a greater measure of independence, or will, for reasons of military and economic strategy, take the side of the colonial powers in areas of unrest such as Indonesia, Indo-China and Malaya, and thus offer a convenient target for Communist propaganda. In any final UN showdown, the United States undoubtedly has the power to mobilize the world against Russia. What we need beyond that is the imagination to mobilize the world for a positive program applicable not to conditions as they existed before 1914 or 1939, but as they are today.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

U.S. and Britain Back New Palestine Plan

The tragic assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, UN Mediator in Palestine, has touched off several significant developments which may hasten far-reaching action on the Holy Land. The Palestine question was placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly on September 23, shortly after Bernadotte's own recommendations for a compromise solution of the Arab-Jewish dispute had been announced. Strong United States support for Bernadotte's plan was promptly given by Secretary of State Marshall, and British representatives have also approved it, urging that the Mediator's report be considered at once. Marshall further stated on September 23 that both Israel and Trans-Jordan should be admitted to the UN.

Is Plan Final?

In essence the late UN Mediator called for a halt to strife in Palestine and imposition by the UN of a compromise settlement backed by international guarantees.

A redrawing of the frontiers between Arab and Jewish areas, acceptance of Israel as a sovereign state, and final determination of the political future of Arab Palestine were also set forth by Bernadotte as prerequisites of a reasonable compromise. According to Bernadotte's suggestions, the Jewish portion of Palestine would be reduced to an area about half the size proposed in the partition plan voted by the UN Assembly last November 29. Both Arab and Jewish sectors, however, would be consolidated into compact geographic units, for the southern desert region of the Negeb would go to the Arabs while that of Western Galilee in the North would become Jewish territory. Bernadotte also recommended that Jerusalem and its environs become an enclave under special UN administration as had been previously proposed, but in addition he suggested that the northern port of Haifa, lying within Israeli territory, should become a free port. Lydda, in Central Pal-

estine, he stated, should be a free airport and Jaffa, the Arab seaport, should be included in Israel. The city of Jaffa had been designated as an Arab enclave by the November partition decision.

Arab-Jewish Reactions

Neither the Jews nor the Arabs in Palestine can accept these new proposals in their entirety. Whether Bernadotte's recommendations represent a final plan for Palestine, therefore, will depend on the firmness with which they are supported by the great powers. World Zionist leaders have denounced the Bernadotte compromise, but a new turning point may have been reached within Palestine itself. The Tel Aviv government naturally objects to ceding the large Negeb area to the Arabs, yet it may find it wise to consolidate its gains rather than press on for more concessions, particularly if the great powers are determined to effect a settlement at this time.

Bernadotte's assassination brought quick action on the part of the Provisional Israeli regime to suppress terrorist groups within the Jewish community. If its measures prove successful, Israel will stand on more solid ground in its appeal for full recognition as an independent state. The cabinet of Provisional Premier David Ben-Gurion will also be in a better position to accept the main terms of the Bernadotte compromise, since it will no longer be under pressure to placate terrorist elements which have so far opposed any form of partition. To date the terrorists have not only demanded all of Palestine for Israel, but on occasion have proposed that the Jewish state should include Trans-Jordan.

Recent events on the Arab side, too, suggest that a compromise may be in the offing. The Arab Higher Committee on September 22 announced the formation of a "Palestine government" at Gaza, claiming jurisdiction over all of Palestine. The importance of this move should not be overestimated, for it at once brought criticism from King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan who declined to support the new regime. But opposition by Abdullah reveals a rift among Arab leaders, which—if it extends to a split within the Arab League—may provide an additional reason for compromise. Since Abdullah has

wanted to build a greater Trans-Jordan by the addition of Arab Palestine territories to his kingdom, he might under present circumstances be willing to recognize the Israeli state.

Shifting Great Power Policies

Announcement that both Britain and the United States favor the Bernadotte plan is perhaps the most important evidence that some form of settlement may soon become possible. It should be borne in mind, however, that American policy is still subject to political pressures at home—increasingly so with the approach of the November elections. Past experience indicates that a shift on Palestine policy by any one of the great powers may not be permanent.

London has yet to recognize the state of Israel. But, as Viscount Samuel, Britain's first High Commissioner in Palestine, said on September 24 in the House of Lords, acceptance of the Mediator's report implies eventual recognition. Britain can now look forward to the establishment of a military base in Arab Palestine, especially if that area is brought under the control of King Abdullah. Moreover, the creation of a free port in Haifa will also appeal to London as a means of safeguarding transportation of oil from northern Iraqi fields to that

pipe-line terminus and oil-refining center.

Russia's explicit approval or rejection of the Bernadotte suggestions has not been announced, although Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Y. Vishinsky, on September 25, indicated that his government would probably adhere to the original UN plan of November 29. Vishinsky accused the Security Council of not carrying out its duty on Palestine and charged that the United States, in particular, had disregarded the November decision. Like the other great powers, however, the U.S.S.R. can be expected to seek the maximum advantage from any new decisions that are to be taken. In this connection some interest attaches to an article in *Pravda* on September 21, which criticized the Zionist movement and the present Tel Aviv government. Communists have long opposed Zionism as "bourgeois nationalism," and last year when Russia approved of partition in Palestine its representatives emphasized that the Soviet Union considered division of the area only a second-best solution to a unitary Arab-Jewish state. Having gained Zionist sympathy by its original vote for partition, Russia now stands to regain some measure of Arab good will by reviving its former hostility to Zionist aims.

GRANT S. McCLELLAN

Britain Seeks U. S. Armed Support

WASHINGTON—Herbert S. Morrison, leader of the House of Commons, touched on a major foreign policy issue when, on September 14, he told the House that Britain must promptly augment its supply of military equipment, especially in air defense and infantry. Since neither Britain nor the other Western European countries possess the industrial capacity to manu-

facture all their estimated armament requirements, they have been discreetly sounding out the Truman administration on the possibility of obtaining new weapons here, perhaps through a modified lend-lease arrangement.

The arrival of Sir Stafford Cripps, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, in Washington on September 27 underlined

the problem created by the increasingly strong belief among the Western powers that their military establishments are inadequate. While Cripps came to the United States primarily to attend the meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, he planned also to explore with American officials the impediments

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By VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 24th day of September, 1948.

[Seal]

CAROLYN E. MARTIN, Notary Public.

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which may prevent Britain from making faster progress toward economic recovery in terms of production at home and commerce overseas. It was not his business to deal with this matter directly, but everything he said was colored by uncertainty whether the West, especially the United States, should reduce its schedules for the production of peacetime goods in order to increase the output of ordnance.

Revival of Military Lend-Lease?

Although the issue has been developing since last winter, the Administration has put off until after election day open presentation to the public of the question whether we should assume responsibility for supplying arms to Western Europe. A series of accidents accounts for the delay.

Until June President Truman hesitated to discuss the problem because Congress had not taken final action on the bills putting into effect the Marshall plan and the new draft law. Since the conclusion of the Republican National Convention in June, the President has avoided public consideration of the issue from fear of starting a vehement national controversy which, in spite of the sincere efforts of both the Republican and Democratic parties to maintain a united front on foreign affairs, might foment intense partisan debate during the Presidential campaign.

However, by his assertion on September 22 that the United States should "use" its foreign aid program "to bring about" a federation in Western Europe, Governor Thomas E. Dewey, Republican Presidential candidate, gave the impression that he is ready to raise the issue at a fitting time. While Europeans who have been investigating the possibilities of establishing some sort of federalism appear undecided whether they want the United States to help them directly in this enterprise, they clearly believe an increase in their military strength and the creation of a system for military co-operation are necessary steps toward union. In keeping with this view, the five Brussels pact nations have set up a joint military committee, which met in Paris on September 27, with United States and Canadian observers present.

The inauguration of a program of mili-

tary aid for Western Europe would not be a complete novelty. Since 1947 Congress has specifically authorized the Administration to supply ordnance to Greece and Turkey. But it has consistently discouraged the sale of new weapons elsewhere abroad since the termination of wartime lend-lease in 1945, and this year it forbade the export of surplus arms (except to a few specified areas). Twice, in 1946 and 1947, Congress ignored the Administration's requests for authority to distribute armaments to the governments of the American Republics and Canada. Lately this tendency to limit the ability of the United States to send arms abroad has been rooted in a belief that the United States could preserve the peace by strengthening itself militarily while it strengthened Europe economically. "We need to maintain substantial military power, but I would rate the need for restoration of the European community as equally strong," Secretary of Defense Forrestal told the House Foreign Affairs Committee last January 15. The deterioration of American-Russian relations might induce Congress to re-examine the validity of Forrestal's dictum, which a few months ago prompted Congress to enact the Marshall plan and the draft law.

BLAIR BOLLES

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Profile of Europe, by Sam Welles. New York, Harper, 1948. \$3.50

An associate editor of *Time* gives a wide-ranging, thoughtful picture of postwar developments on the European continent. Mr. Welles is vigorously critical of Russia, but believes war can be averted if the United States pursues a consistent policy based on genuinely democratic ideas and practices.

News in the Making

A conference was held in Moscow last week at which Soviet leaders are reported to have discussed *Cominform problems*, such as Tito's revolt, with prominent Communists of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. . . . Russia's insistence that the question of *Italy's former colonies* should be taken up by the UN General Assembly early in the session has been matched by the insistence of the United States that discussion of this prickly issue should be postponed until after the November elections here. . . . Amid the encircling gloom it is heartening to note that the largest single mass-immunization campaign against tuberculosis ever undertaken is proceeding in Europe under the auspices of the *United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)*. This campaign is a dramatic demonstration of the constructive work that can be accomplished once nations lay aside considerations of national sovereignty and prestige and band together to accomplish a common task. The objective of this campaign is to test 50 million children and adolescents under 18 in the war-ravaged countries of Europe for tuberculosis infection and susceptibility to the disease; about 15 million—those who may require it—will be vaccinated with BCG vaccine. The UNICEF is providing most of the supplies and equipment; the Danish Red Cross, the Swedish Red Cross and Norwegian Help for Europe provide specially trained physicians and nurses and medical supplies; the Ministry of Health in each country where the campaign is conducted provides national medical teams and facilities; the World Health Organization (WHO) provides technical advice and assistance. . . . The outlook for a *Western European Union* remains confused. In a public opinion poll announced September 13 in *The Daily Express*, 68 per cent of those questioned favored military union of the five Western powers, 65 per cent supported economic integration, and 58 per cent approved strong political union. Conservatives and Liberals appear more favorable to Western European Union than some of the Labor government spokesmen.

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